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Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct
Jon 0. Newmant
In the post-Watergate era, the public has focused an increasingly
critical eye on the conduct of public officials. Misconduct in high office
has attracted most media attention, yet more serious problems lie at the
day-to-day working levels of government, where misconduct is likely to
occur more frequently and to affect more people, many of whom have
no effective means of remedying its effects or preventing its recurrence.
Any misuse of public authority threatens the equilibrium of a system
resting so fundamentally on the consent of the governed, but the
threat is most acute when the misconduct injures a citizen directly-
especially if it denies him a constitutionally protected right.
Nowhere is this threat more dangerous than in the administration of
criminal justice, where large numbers of society's least powerful mem-
bers confront awesome governmental power. The unlawful arrest, the
unjustified search, the prosecution based on evidence known to be
false, the mistreatment by a jailer-all victimize the most vulnerable of
the citizenry. Their individual liberty, privacy, and physical well-being
are the initial casualties. Ultimately, such injuries threaten the vitality
of a system of ordered liberty.
Holding law enforcers accountable to the commands of the law is an
age-old challenge not yet fully met. To be sure, our legal system em-
bodies substantive standards to curb the conduct of law-enforcement
officials. But standards are not self-executing, even when endowed
with the significance and permanence of explicit constitutional status.
There must be effective enforcement devices to ensure the highest de-
gree of realization of two crucial goals: deterring potential wrong-
doers from violating constitutional standards and affording remedies
t United States District Judge, District of Connecticut.
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that secure adequate compensation for victims of official transgressions.
Here our system needs significant improvement, for acts of official mis-
conduct are not isolated occurrences and remain a pervasive source of
justified public outrage.
The arsenal for defending constitutional rights in the law enforce-
ment process contains three basic weapons, none of which suffices to
ensure compensation and deterrence. The best known, perhaps, is the
"exclusionary rule." In 1961 the Supreme Court elevated the exclu-
sionary rule to constitutional status," in the hope that it would deter
misconduct by removing a major incentive to overreach-the prospect
of using against the accused evidence unlawfully acquired. 2 Un-
doubtedly the exclusionary rule has deterred some illegal searches and
some coercive interrogations, though success in this area is not easily
measured. But the available empirical evidence suggests that the rule
is not an especially effective deterrent,3 and many have observed that
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court in Mapp was not in complete agree-
ment. Justice Clark's majority opinion found the exclusionary rule "logically and con-
stitutionally necessary" to the right of privacy protected by the Constitution. Id. at 656.
Justice Clark was referring to the right to be free of offenses against "ordered liberty"-
a right already recognized. But Mapp also read the exclusionary rule specifically into the
Fourth Amendment, as incorporated against the states: "the exclusionary rule is an
essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... " Id. at 657. Justice
Black concurred, but with the reservation that "I am still not persuaded that the Fourth
Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction against an accused
of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its commands." Id. at 661 (emphasis
added). But by viewing the Fourth Amendment together with the Fifth, Justice Black
concluded that "a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually
requires the exclusionary rule." Id. at 662. The dissent by Justice Harlan argued that
the exclusionary rule is a remedy not required by the "ordered liberty" embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 678-80. Because of his view of the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Bill of Rights, however, Justice Harlan
did not consider whether the Fourth Amendment, which in his view applied only to the
federal government, required the particular remedy of exclusion. Id. at 678.
2. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
3. Empirical studies of the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule are inconclusive at
best. Yet one can safely assert that they fall far short of establishing that excluding
illegally obtained evidence tends systematically to deter misconduct. Several studies in-
dicate that the rule has not significantly affected police behavior and conclude that it
has little if any value as a deterrent. The best-known of these studies are Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The
Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. PoLICE ScI. & AD. 36 (1973).
Researchers more favorable to the rule have attacked these studies but concede that their
own evidence is no more conclusive. See, e.g., Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing
Health? Some New Data and a Plea against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681
(1974). See generally S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 50-56 (1977) (surveying major
empirical studies and arguing that weight of evidence is that exclusionary rule is in-
effective as deterrent); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the
Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69
Nw. U.L. Rav. 740 (1974) (arguing that it is virtually impossible objectively to measure
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whatever deterrence occurs may not be worth the frequent price of
freeing a guilty person "because the constable has blundered."4 An in-
creasingly vocal minority of the Supreme Court has mounted a vigorous
attack on the exclusionary rule,5 and its future as a constitutional re-
quirement is at least in doubt. In any event, even if the rule does deter
some future misconduct at justifiable expense, it provides no remedy
to the truly innocent victim of past misconduct.0
A second available weapon is the criminal prosecution of officials
who wilfully deny constitutional rights . The pending prosecution of a
former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has refocused at-
tention on the possible uses of this approach, but regardless of the out-
come in United States v. Kearney,8 the criminal sanction will never
deterrent effect of exclusionary rule). The Supreme Court recently drew the "clear" con-
clusion that "[n]o empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been
able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect even in the
situations in which it is now applied." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22 (1976).
See id. at 450 n.22 (canvassing literature).
Empirical research at least raises serious doubts about the deterrent effect of the ex-
clusionary rule, doubts that are reinforced by other considerations. The rule excludes only
evidence offered at trial; hence, it directly affects only a small part of the criminal pro-
cess. It does not even aim squarely at all police misconduct, which encompasses more than
illegal searches and interrogations, much less at the broader problem of "official" mis-
conduct. And, of course, as an immediate restriction, the rule affects only the prosecutor.
For full discussions of these and other factors, see S. SCHLESINGER, supra at 56-60; Oaks,
supra at 720-36. See generally Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L.
Rrv. 1027 (1974). Chief Justice Burger canvasses the rule's drawbacks and limitations in
his well-known dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
416-20 (1971).
4. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926)
(Cardozo, J.). That the exclusionary rule can sometimes operate to free the guilty and
more often to impede their prosecution is indisputable. "Jurists and scholars uniformly
have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal in-
terest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence."
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 429 (1974)).
5. The first and still most prominent attack is that of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
More recent cases have refused to extend the scope of the rule and display at best a
dubious endorsement of the worth of its fundamental rationale. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (if state has allowed opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth
Amendment claim, state prisoner cannot obtain habeas corpus relief because of violation
of exclusionary rule); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evidence seized by state
law enforcement officials in violation of exclusionary rule is admissible in civil proceed-
ings by federal government); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to
extend rule to grand jury proceedings).
6. The guilty person whose conviction is precluded by the exclusionary rule has, in
a sense, obtained a "remedy" for the violation of his rights, although many would view
the remedy as too generous to him and too costly to society to be warranted. Doubtless,
he would prefer the avoidance of conviction to a more traditional compensatory remedy,
but he is entitled only to an appropriate remedy, not to a preferred one.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245 (1970).
8. Crim. No. 77-245 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 7, 1977).
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have significance as a deterrent. Its use is bound to be sporadic at best.
Prosecutors, who need to maintain close working relationships with
law enforcement agencies, are disinclined to charge police officials with
criminal conduct. Moreover, the criminal case requires not only
evidence that a constitutional right was denied, but proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the wrongdoer acted with specific intent to deny
such a right.9 This requirement, never easily met, coupled with the
understandable reluctance of juries to brand as criminals those who,
however misguidedly, are seeking to enforce the law, ensures that even
when prosecutions are brought convictions will be rare. And, again,
to whatever extent an occasional conviction promotes the public in-
terest in maintaining standards of official observance of the law in the
future, the victim of misconduct is not thereby afforded a remedy.
There remains the possibility of the civil damage remedy' 0-the
direct claim of the victim of official wrongdoing to secure compensa-
tion for the denial of his rights. The suit can be based on common law,
as with the traditional tort action for false arrest,"' or on statute, as
with actions specifically authorized by Congress' 2 and many of the
9. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945) (plurality opinion); cf. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 US. 167, 187 (1961) (specific intent not required for civil liability).
10. Suits for civil damages can and often do include a prayer for injunctive relief. The
injunction has great potential as a deterrent mechanism, for it can impose sweeping
prospective requirements for systemic reform. Nonetheless, I view the civil damage
remedy as the primary candidate for immediate and fruitful reform efforts-partly be-
cause the injunction generally follows rather than replaces an initial determination of
civil liability for damages, partly because the injunction, which is best imposed upon
supervisory officials as a remedy for patterns of systemic abuse, has been severely limited
by Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Rizzo not only held that supervisory officials
cannot be found liable unless they affirmatively implement unconstitutional policies, see
id. at 375-77, but also raised the troublesome question of federalism, id. at 379-80. The
impact of Rizzo is graphically illustrated by Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1977), which casts doubt on the availability of
injunctions against supervisory officials and individual wrongdoers. But see Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc).
The injunction remedy may be more available to deter misconduct by prison officials
than by police officials. See, e.g., Todard v. Ward, No. 77-2095 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 1977). See
generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133,
1227-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
The proposed amendments to S. 35, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S124 (daily
ed. Jan. 10, 1977), now pending in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, would
specifically authorize injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) against states or
governmental units in the form of an order to adopt remedial measures to prevent re-
currence of abuse. See 123 CONG. REC. S16560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977) (amendment
proposed by Sen. Mathias). For more on S. 35 and its House counterparts, see note 38 infra.
11. See, e.g., Dragna v. White, 45 Cal. 2d 469, 289 P.2d 428 (1955); Johnson v. Jackson,
43 Il. App. 2d 251, 193 N.E.2d 485 (1963). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ToRTs § 11 (4th ed. 1971).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970).
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states,' 3 or on provisions of the Constitution itself, as with an action
against federal officers for Fourth Amendment violations.14
The private suit for civil damages can both compensate and deter.
In the battle to restrain official misconduct, it is our most promising
weapon, and of its several forms the claim authorized by federal statute
can best be shaped to achieve both objectives. Obviously, the common
law action could be effectively and uniformly strengthened only
through legislation. The action founded directly on the Constitution
encounters not only the uncertainty that its scope may be limited to
violations of only the Fourth Amendment 15 but also the more funda-
mental objection that the broad commands of the Constitution are
inappropriate sources from which to infer detailed provisions for an
effective cause of action. Congress has both the power and the
responsibility to legislate protection for constitutional rights, and
federal statutes are the logical sources of authority for effective law-
suits to remedy deprivations of federal constitutional rights.
The principal federal statute authorizing a damage suit for depriva-
tion of constitutional rights is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute permits
any person injured by official conduct that violates the Constitution
or a federal statute to sue the person responsible at law or in equity.'0
Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1,17 section
1983 lay virtually dormant for ninety years. Then, in 1961, the
Supreme Court ruled that state officials could not avoid its sanctions
13. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 52 (West Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-3(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1977); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147 (West 1968 & Supp.
1977-78) (treble damages liability); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-7 (West 1976) (civil and criminal
liability); N.Y. Civ. RicHTS LAW § 40-d (McKinney 1976) (same).
14. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Colo. 1974) (no implied
cause of action against federal officials for damages resulting from denial of due process
under Fifth Amendment); Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Colo. 1974)
(same as to First Amendment); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(same as to Fifth Amendment). But see, e.g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498
F.2d 1146, 1157 (4th Cir. 1974) (implied cause of action for damages against federal of-
ficials allowed for denial of Fifth Amendment rights); Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broad-
casting Co., 424 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, No. 77-7111 (2d
Cir. Oct. 27, 1977) (same as to First Amendment); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.
v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1088-89 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (same).
16. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
17. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873).
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by asserting that their actions were also prohibited by state law.'8 The
rejection of this defense and the renewed attention to the protection of
civil rights during the 1960s spurred an extraordinary increase in the
number of lawsuits filed under section 1983 and other civil rights
statutes. The nationwide totals were 280 in 1960,19 3985 in 1970,20 and
12,213 in 1977.21 In the context of misconduct in the law enforcement
process, the section 1983 suit is typically brought by a person arrested
and later exonerated 22 against state or local police officers for an un-
lawful arrest, an unlawful search, or the use of excessive force.
For various reasons this increased use of section 1983 has been
especially evident in recent years in the Federal District Court for
Connecticut, notably at the New Haven seat of court.23 Since 1970,
18. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
19. [1960] AD. OF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 232, table C 2 (1961). Though there
are no statistics on the numbers of suits filed under § 1983 alone, the statute doubtless
accounts for a large proportion of the increase. A quick perusal of annotations to § 1983
strongly supports this inference. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1974) (469 pages of
annotations); id. (West Supp. 1977) (337 additional pages of annotations). See also P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149 (2d ed. Supp. 1977) (noting that "[t]he 'impressive flood' of
§ 1983 litigation . . . has, in the past five years, reached epic proportions"). It should be
noted that the figure in the text does not include habeas corpus or other prisoner actions.
20. [1970] AD. OF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 232, table C 2 (1971). See also note
19 supra (discussing published figures).
21. [1977] Ai)..OF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. A-14, table C 2 (1977). The 1977
Annual Report also gives a figure of 13,113. See id. at 82, table 11. Unlike those cited in
notes 19 & 20 supra, the 1977 total for civil rights actions (excluding prisoner petitions) is
broken down into categories, as follows: voting, 203; jobs, 5031; accommodations, 442;
welfare, 219; other civil rights, 6318. Id. at A-14, table C 2. Section 1983 claims against law
enforcement officials would fall within the last category.
22. If an unlawful arrest results in a valid conviction, some courts have held a
damage suit under § 1983 barred either by expanded notions of collateral estoppel, see,
e.g., Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1976); Watson v. Devlin, 167 F. Supp. 638
(E.D. Mich. 1958); or by application of common law defenses, see, e.g., Pouncey v. Ryan,
396 F. Supp. 126 (D. Conn. 1975). Neither of these approaches defeats an action for
unlawful search or use 'of excessive force. Other courts have not invoked collateral
estoppel even as to unlawful arrest claims, see Jackson v. Official Representatives &
Employees of the Los Angeles Police Dep't, 487 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1973); or at least have
indicated in dictum that they would not do so, see Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249,
1254-55 (1st Cir. 1974); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968).
23. The impetus to challenge alleged police misconduct in New Haven by means of
damage suits under § 1983 appears to have developed in 1970. A seminar conducted by
Professor Thomas I. Emerson at the Yale Law School explored various uses of the law to
affect social policy, including litigation against the police. A student paper on this topic
came to the attention of New Haven attorney John Williams. See Harmon, Cops in the
Courts, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 334 (1972). Attorney Williams' interest in this subject
had been piqued earlier by attendance at the November 1970 National Conference on
Police-Community Relations in Los Angeles, California, sponsored by the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration. Attorney Williams and his former partner, Michael
Avery, have brought most of the § 1983 suits against police officers in New Haven,
materially aided by the availability of Yale law students to assist with research.
There appears to be no reason to believe that actual or alleged misconduct by police
officers in New Haven has been more extensive than what might be expected in any other
city of comparable size.
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approximately 150 lawsuits have been filed alleging denials of con-
stitutional rights by police officers. Though some of these have been
withdrawn, dismissed, or settled for nominal sums, many have gone to
trial. I have tried twenty-seven of these cases to a conclusion, twenty-
four to a jury and three to the court.24
Thinking about these cases has left me with a firm conclusion: the
section 1983 damage suit has potential as an effective deterrent and
compensatory remedy but must be substantially restructured to afford
the injured victim a better chance of success. The lawsuit, as cur-
rently authorized by statute and limited by prevailing appellate court
decisions, suffers from several shortcomings. It is a suit brought by
the wrong plaintiff against the wrong defendant, subject to the wrong
defenses, litigated under the wrong burden of proof, and rewarded if
successful with the wrong measure of damages.
I. The Wrong Plaintiff
The plaintiff in a section 1983 suit is "the party injured," the person
who has been unlawfully arrested, against whom excessive force has
been used, or whose residence has been unlawfully searched. If the
misconduct is a tort, albeit one transgressing constitutional standards,
the party injured is an appropriate plaintiff. But he should not be
the only plaintiff. Whenever it appears that the Constitution or laws
of the United States have been violated, the United States itself should
be permitted to sue to redress the wrong. The United States should be
authorized to intervene as a plaintiff in the victim's lawsuit and to
initiate a suit for the benefit of the victim.
Plainly the United States has an important and legitimate interest
in maintaining observance of constitutional standards. At present, it
can vindicate that interest only by recourse to criminal prosecution of
the wrongdoer.25 That avenue may be appropriate in extreme cases 2 6
but it is both too drastic when successful and too likely to be unsuccess-
ful to be relied on as a deterrent. The government's use of a civil
remedy would frequently be more appropriate to the harm inflicted,
24. At least one of the plaintiffs has prevailed in seven of the jury cases and one of
the bench trials, indicating more likelihood of success than some might have anticipated.
Generalizations about the chances of success, however, should be cautiously drawn. In
many of the cases won by plaintiffs, the facts were especially aggravated, and helpful
evidence sometimes came from police officers themselves.
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245 (1970).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (criminal prosecution for
deprivation of federal rights based on killing of civil rights workers); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (same, based on denial of equal accommodations to blacks).
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less likely to imperil relations with state law enforcement agencies, and
more likely to be successful than would a criminal prosecution.
Intervention by the United States as plaintiff when an important
national standard has been transgressed is not unusual. The United
States or its agencies can bring a civil action to redress violations of
statutes protecting voting rights2 7 and nondiscrimination in employ-
ment 28 and places of public accommodation, 29 and intervention is
authorized in numerous similar situations.3 0 The government has at
least an equally strong interest in enforcing section 1983, a statute that
prohibits transgressions of the Constitution itself.
The principal consequence of the United States' appearing as the
sole or additional plaintiff in a section 1983 suit would be an in-
creased likelihood of a jury verdict in favor of the victim. Such an in-
crease is needed to correct the current imbalance in the jury appeal
of the contending parties in the courtroom. At the defendants' table
sit the police officers-well-groomed, in full uniform, and with the
American flag figuratively wrapped around them and often literally
displayed on their jackets. Except in those rare instances when the
party injured is the white, middle-class victim of police mistake, the
section 1983 plaintiff is likely to be black or Puerto Rican, poor, di-
sheveled, a felon, and often a drug addict.
Frequently the imbalance of jury appeal is further distorted by the
facts of the episode in which the alleged police misconduct occurred.
Although some police misconduct is perpetrated against entirely law-
abiding citizens, it frequently happens that the plaintiff's grievance
arose during police efforts to apprehend him for an offense he had in
fact committed. Obviously, the protections of the Constitution safe-
guard the guilty and innocent alike, yet knowledge of the plaintiff's
criminal conduct prior to arrest often undermines a jury's impartial
assessment of claims such as police brutality. The jury would view the
contest in a totally different light if, instead of a young firebrand
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (1970); id. § 1973aa-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); id.
§ 1973bb (Supp. V 1975).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
29. Id. § 2000a-(5)(a) (1970).
30. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1709 (Supp. V 1975) (Attorney General may intervene in suits
alleging denial of equal educational opportunity); 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970) (United States
may intervene in any suit that involves constitutionality of federal statute, provided agency
of government is not already party to suit); 31 U.S.C.A. § 1244(c) (West Supp. 1977)
(Attorney General may intervene in private suits alleging that state or local governments
have violated requirements of revenue-sharing laws); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V
1975) (Attorney General may intervene in suits alleging discrimination in employment); id.
§ 2000h-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (same, for suits alleging violations of equal protection
clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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lawyer pleading for money for his disreputable private client, an As-
sistant United States Attorney were presenting, on behalf of the public,
the claim that the police officer had denied the victim a right protected
by the United States Constitution.
The increased likelihood of success for the victim would not only
strengthen the remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights but
would also enhance the deterrent effect of the suit. That suspects pose
little threat of becoming attractive plaintiffs in damage actions is
precisely the reason why some police officers are unlikely to observe
constitutional standards in apprehending them. The prospect of a
government lawsuit, with its greater chance of success, would not be
lost on law enforcers familiar with couitrooms and juries.
Of course, intervention by the United States need not be obligatory.
It should be within the discretion of the Department of Justice, acting
through United States Attorneys in each district, to initiate or in-
tervene in a section 1983 lawsuit whenever there is a reasonable basis
to believe that public officials have violated any person's constitutional
rights.3 '
II. The Wrong Defendant
The defendant in a section 1983 suit is the "person" who "under
color of" state law committed the alleged deprivation of constitutional
or statutory right. Typically this means a police officer. Despite the
similarity of section 1983 suits to tort actions, respondeat superior is
not available 32 and the employing governmental unit is not considered
a "person" within the meaning of the statute.33 At present, therefore,
31. The "reasonable basis" standard is not intended to be an element of the Govern-
ment's case, required to be proved before intervention is permitted. Certification by the
United States Attorney or an appropriate official of the Department of Justice should
suffice. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1970), under which the United States may apply for
an order granting immunity to a witness when, in the judgment of designated Depart-
ment of Justice officials, the testimony may be necessary to safeguard the public interest.
The Justice Department's determination is essentially nonreviewable. See United States
v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 402 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 776
(5th Cir. 1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973).
32. See Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1973); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971); Dunham
v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1180 (1st Cir. 1970) (dictum). But see Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358, 370 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Hesselgesser v.
Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), held that municipalities are not "persons"
within the meaning of § 1983. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), made clear
that this was true in actions for equitable relief as well as for damages (as in Monroe). Both
decisions relied heavily upon the legislative history of § 1983. The Court's interpretation
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liability can be imposed only upon the individuals who commit or
cause the misconduct.3 4
Placing liability on the immediate wrongdoer has strong superficial
appeal. But the objectives of compensating the victim and deterring
misconduct would be met more frequently if the defendant were the
wrongdoer's employer-either the appropriate unit of government or
the governmental agency. In addition, the statute should be broadened
to include misconduct by federal as well as state officers and hence to
impose liability on the federal government or its agencies as well as on
the governments or agencies of states and municipalities. 35
The chances of compensating the victim decrease markedly when the
defendant is the individual police officer. A jury understandably suc-
cumbs easily to the argument, stated or implied, that recovery should
be denied because the damages must come from the paycheck of a
hard-working, underpaid police officer. If the officer is judgment
proof, neither compensation nor substantial deterrence is likely to
result, even when the plaintiff wins. Ironically, those jurisdictions that
provide indemnification for the police officer do little to make the
lawsuit more effective. Actually, where indemnification is available,
the present system of suing only the individual wrongdoer combines
the worst of both worlds. The jurors, not informed of indemnification,
think the officer will personally have to pay any damages awarded, so
of that history, however, has been termed "highly questionable," the history itself "[a]t
best . . . ambiguous." Developments, supra note 10, at 1192.
Townships, counties, and most municipal agencies are immune from § 1983 liability
under the doctrine established by Monroe and Kenosha. For a useful collection of cases,
see id. at 1194-95 nn.31-36. Most pertinent, perhaps, to the present discussion is United
States ex rel. Lee v. People of the State of Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965), which
held that a city police department was not a "person" for purposes of § 1983.
Several cases have suggested that this immunity for municipalities implies an analogous
immunity for the states. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gittlemacher v. County of
Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84, 86 n.2 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970) (this
conclusion termed "inescapable"). The most important consideration with respect to state
liability for damages, however, is the Eleventh Amendment, though this barrier too could
easily be overcome by congressional action. See pp. 457-58 & notes 37-39 infra.
34. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-76 (1975); Duchesne v. Sugarman, No.
76-7475 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1977), slip op. at 6131.
35. The 1975 amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. V
1975), provide a mechanism for private citizens to bring tort actions against the United
States for certain acts by federal law enforcement or investigative officials. But the
amendments are not tailored to all the problems of police misconduct, even though
they do authorize actions for false arrest and assault. Moreover, the context of tort law
is an inappropriate one for the adjudication of constitutional claims. See pp. 461-62 & note
59 infra. It would seem more fitting to restructure § 1983 as the primary vehicle for all
such actions, thereby providing a single point of reference for judicial interpretation and
development. From the standpoint of increasing the plaintiff's chances of success, though,
there may be merit in preserving the remedy offered by the Tort Claims Act for mis-
conduct by federal law enforcement agents, since the statutory claim against the United
States is not subject to trial by jury, 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970).
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they tend to find for defendants and, when damages are awarded, to
keep the amount at a modest level. Yet the defendant is not deterred
from wrongdoing by the prospect of paying damages, for he knows
that any damage award will be covered by municipal indemnification.
Providing for suit directly against the employing department or
unit of government would accomplish more than simply informing the
jury of a deeper pocket. It would enhance the prospects for deterrence
by placing responsibility for the denial of constitutional rights on the
entity with the capacity to take vigorous action to avoid recurrence.
Police agencies and governments should be forced to assume responsi-
bility for minimizing instances of official misconduct. Placing the
burden of damage awards for constitutional wrongs directly upon them
would afford a useful incentive to monitor the performance of their
employees, to insist on observance of constitutional standards, and to
exercise appropriate internal discipline when misconduct occurs. 36
There are obvious potential obstacles to this reform. Actions against
states will face the defense of the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme
Court has ruled, however, that when Congress enforces the commands
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it has constitutional authority to im-
pose liability that the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise pre-
clude.37 That decision was made in the context of racial discrimination,
a core concept of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether it applies to
congressional efforts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's in-
corporation of the Bill of Rights remains to be seen. Surely the theory
is sufficiently plausible to justify a congressional attempt.38 Of course,
36. Because the police often feel a sense of professional solidarity and isolation, see,
e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSncE WITHOUT TRIAL 52-53, 59 (2d ed. 1975), professional norms may
override the effect of legal rules. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 727. In addition, police may
not be familiar with or fully understand some of the esoteric legal rules that supposedly
influence their conduct. Enforcement of the exclusionary rule, for instance, which places
immediate controls on the prosecutor seeking to introduce evidence rather than on the
policeman collecting it, has been hampered because the legal rules that are applied when
the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence generally are not effectively communicated to
police officers. Id. at 726, 730. See also sources cited in final paragraph of note 3 supra.
37. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). For further discussion of the
Eleventh Amendment problem, see Developments, supra note 10, at 1195-97.
38. Indeed, Congress now has before it the proposed Civil Rights Improvements Act of
1977, which would amend § 1983 to permit suits against state and local governments
under certain limited circumstances. The Senate version of the bill is S. 35, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S124 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), now pending in the Committee on
the Judiciary. House versions, all identical in substance to S. 35, abound and are like-
wise pending in the House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. 7520, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123
CONG. REc. H5257 (daily ed. June 1, 1977); H.R. 6677, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CON;.
REc. H3708 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1977); H.R. 6151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
H3181 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1977); H.R. 5535, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. RFc. H2547
(daily ed. Mar. 23, 1977); H.R. 4514, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H1756 (daily ed.
Mar. 4, 1977); H.R. 549, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H195 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977).
The bill, however, would impose liability upon states, local governments, and their
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if the United States itself were bringing the action, the problem of
sovereign immunity would vanish.39
Imposing liability upon the federal government presents no problem
of sovereign immunity; Congress clearly can consent to such suits. A
different problem emerges, however, if the United States is permitted
to initiate or intervene in section 1983 litigation against federal of-
ficials. If the wrongdoer were an agent of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, for example, the case caption United States v. FBI would
suggest an issue as to the requisite adversity of the parties. This
problem could readily be solved by creating within the executive
branch a special office empowered to bring suit against the federal
wrongdoer's employing agency. Analogous are the authority of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to sue agencies of the
federal government that discriminate in employment 0 and the re-
cently upheld power of the Watergate Special Prosecutor to bring an
action against the President. 41
III. The Wrong Defenses
Two types of defenses are currently available to defendants sued for
damages under section 1983. Most defendants, from governors42 to
policemen,43 are entitled to the defense of good faith. A few de-
agencies for constitutional deprivations by their employees only if (1) a superior officer
directed or approved the wrongful action by the employee, or failed to remedy a pattern
of wrongful action by the employee, or (2) an unidentified employee denied protected
rights by grossly negligent conduct. Arguably, the bill would also impose liability on
governments or agencies for their wrongful corporate acts, i.e., those taken by official
agency action without regard to wrongdoing by any individual employees. Cf. Gentile v.
Wallen, No. 77-7093, slip op. at 5952 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 1977) (claim against board of educa-
tion "in its corporate capacity" states cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment,
despite fact that board of education is not "person" within meaning of § 1983).
Amendments to clarify the substance of S. 35 were introduced in early October. See 123
CONc. REc. S16560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977). Initial hearings on the bill, originally
scheduled for October 28-29, 1977, were postponed; full hearings are now scheduled for
February 1978. The hearings will afford an opportunity for the Senate Committee to
consider correcting the basic deficiency in the bill as proposed, by eliminating the role of
a supervisory official as a prerequisite to the cause of action and imposing liability on
governmental agencies whenever any law enforcement official has denied someone a
federally protected right.
39. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state when the United
States is a plaintiff. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1970).
41. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974).
42. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal law enforcement officials); Fowler v. Alexander, 340 F.
Supp. 168, 171 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1973) ("conditional and
partial" immunity for local police officers acting in good faith).
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fendants, notably judges44 and prosecutors,4 5 enjoy an absolute im-
munity from suit. Whatever the merits of either defense-and the case
for the good faith defense is the more doubtful-the imposition of
liability upon the wrongdoer's employer would make it entirely ap-
propriate to eliminate both defenses.
A. The Good Faith Defense46
The good faith defense was imported into section 1983 rather
casually from the common law, has been extended uncritically, and
operates in practice at best to create confusion and at worst to defeat
legitimate claims. In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,47 the Supreme Court,
construing section 1983 to impose liability without the element of
wilfullness, observed that the statute "should be read against the back-
ground of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions. '48 Six years later, in Pierson v. Ray,49 this
"background of tort liability," previously invoked to impose liability,
was held to include as a defense to liability the common law defense of
good faith and probable cause when damages are sought from a police
officer because of an arrest. In Pierson the arrest was challenged not
for lack of probable cause, but because the statute pursuant to which
the arrest occurred had later been declared unconstitutional. Thus
"good faith" in the context of Pierson meant only reliance on a duly
enacted statute.
The leading decision giving further content to the phrase "good
faith" in the more typical situation of an arrest challenged for lack of
probable cause is the Second Circuit decision in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Federal Narcotics Agentso on remand from the Supreme
Court.r1 Though Bivens involved a cause of action against federal
agents predicated directly on the Fourth Amendment, the Court of
Appeals' decision held that the federal agents were entitled to the same
44. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
45. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). But cf. Briggs v. Goodwin, No. 75-1578
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 1977), summarized in 22 CRum. L. REP. (BNA) 2001 (Oct. 5, 1977)
(prosecutor charged with perjury incident to grand jury proceedings not protected by
Imbler, which limits immunity to prosecutors' exercise of discretion in conducting crim-
inal cases; Imbler does not extend to "investigative" or "administrative" action by
prosecutors).
46. See generally Developments, supra note 10, at 1209-17; id. (citing sources).
47. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
48. Id. at 187.
49. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
50. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
51. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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defense available to state police officials under section 1983.2 Ex-
plicitly relying on Pierson, the Second Circuit held that the officer has
a defense when he establishes both good faith and a reasonable belief
in the validity of the arrest. As explained by Judge Medina, the de-
fense has both a subjective and an objective element. The officer must
prove "that he believed, in good faith, that his conduct was lawful"
and "that his belief was reasonable. '0 3 Undoubtedly this "objective"
component was added to ensure that an officer could not defeat re-
covery solely by believing in the propriety of his actions, a result that
would correlate the success of the defense with the callousness of the
wrongdoer.
But however well-intentioned this second ingredient of the good
faith defense, it involves nearly circular reasoning that promotes con-
fusion and sometimes defeats meritorious claims. For example, the
victim's cause of action for an arrest in violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights requires an arrest without probable cause. 4 To make out
his case, the plaintiff must establish that a reasonably prudent police
officer, under all the circumstances, would not have had probable cause
to believe that he had committed a crime.55 Then, under Bivens, the
officer still has a defense if he acted in good faith and has a reasonable
belief in the validity of his action, that is, if he reasonably believed
that he did have probable cause. But if the plaintiff's own case requires
him to show an arrest that was not reasonably based on probable cause,
what does the defense mean? Surely the officer could not reasonably
believe that there was probable cause for an unlawful arrest, for an
unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent police
officer could not reasonably believe there was probable cause.
The anomaly of the good faith defense is equally apparent when the
victim alleges the use of excessive force. To establish his cause of
action, the victim must prove the use of more force than was reason-
ably necessary under the circumstances. 56 Once that is shown, how can
the officer have a reasonable belief that he used only necessary force?
Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion in Bivens endeavors to dispel
the apparent circularity of the good faith defense. In the context of
unlawful arrest claims, he distinguishes between two aspects of reason-
ableness. The first, which is presumably part of the plaintiff's case, is
52. 456 F.2d at 1346-47.
53. Id. at 1348.
54. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-16 (1975).
55. The Supreme Court set out the elements of probable cause in Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959).
56. See, e.g., Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1972).
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"reasonableness for purposes of defining probable cause under the
fourth amendment." 57 The second, presumably part of the officer's
defense, is "the less stringent reasonable man standard of the tort ac-
tion against governmental agents."58
Even if these aspects of reasonableness are truly different, it is un-
realistic to suppose that trial judges will successfully articulate the
elusive distinction to the juries who must apply these concepts, much
less that juries, hearing even the most learned charge, will possibly
grasp the distinction. The jurors are told that, even if the plaintiff
proves that an officer lacked probable cause by showing that he could
not have had a reasonable belief that the plaintiff had committed a
crime, the officer nonetheless has a defense if he acted in good faith
and reasonably believed that he did have probable cause. To make sense
of such instructions, jurors inevitably focus, I suspect, on the only
element of the defense that is comprehensible-the subjective good faith
of the officer. Thus the practical vice of the defense in many cases is to
leave the victim without a remedy whenever the officer persuades the
jury that he thought he had the right to arrest.
Even if the employing department or jurisdiction does not replace
the police officer as a defendant, the good faith defense, imported into
section 1988 through unwarranted borrowing from the common law,
should be abolished. The initial step taken in Monroe and extended
in Pierson and Bivens should be reexamined. Why should section 1983
be read against the background of common law tort liability, especially
common law tort defenses? This is a statute passed by Congress to
provide a remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights. When
such a right is denied, the victim is entitled to compensation and the
public is entitled to the deterrent effect of his receiving compensation.
Common law notions, heavily influenced by the concept of fault,
simply have no place in the attainment of these important results.50
57. 456 F.2d at 1348 (concurring opinion).
58. Id. at 1348-49 (concurring opinion).
59. This is not a new argument. Justice Harlan, concurring in Monroe, objected to
the importation of tort law and argued that the deprivation of constitutional rights is
more serious than a common law tort committed by a state official and that state remedies
based on common law tort concepts are thus not fully appropriate in the context of
constitutional claims. 365 U.S. at 196 n.5. Chief Justice Burger, in his Bivens dissent,
advocated that Congress establish a mechanism for such civil damage suits similar to the
Federal Tort Claims Act and suggested specific elements that such a mechanism should
incorporate-among them the abolition of sovereign immunity, which I suggest here. 403
U.S. at 422-23.
The argument that the common law of torts should not be applied to constitutional
claims against state officials has a strong theoretical basis. State officials are clothed with
the state's authority; their ability to invoke that authority makes it more difficult to
curb their tortious conduct. In short, the state official has a status quite different from
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This is not to suggest that either the Constitution or section 1983
establishes strict liability, in the sense of an entitlement to compensa-
tion whenever injury is sustained. The standards of the Constitution,
notably those of the Fourth Amendment, already contain a sufficient
element of reasonableness to avoid any possibility that law enforcement
officers will become guarantors of the liberty or well-being of those
they apprehend. But these standards, however flexible, should be
enforced on their own terms, without further dilution by common law
defenses that evolved under a jurisprudence primarily concerned with
adjusting disputes between private individuals. Constitutional stan-
dards, designed to limit governmental authority over citizens, serve a
more important function. If imposition of personal liability upon the
wrongdoer is thought to have consequences adverse to the proper dis-
charge of his public functions, society can either reimburse the wrong-
doer or shift liability to his employer, rather than deny a reimedy
to the victim. His constitutional rights are just as impaired and the
injury he suffers just as serious regardless of the good faith of the
wrongdoer.
B. Absolute Immunity6 °
The absolute immunity of judges and prosecutors finds its rationale
in the need to maintain the unfettered performance of duty by these
officials. Without immunity, it is argued, a judicial official would be
subjected to a barrage of litigation, the defense of which would inter-
fere with his duties.0 ' Moreover, the official might hesitate to dis-
charge his responsibilities fearlessly or even to accept the responsibili-
ties of office in the first place if he knew that he would be subjected
to personal liability whenever a jury concluded, rightly or wrongly,
that his actions had denied someone a protected right. 2
that of a private citizen. Legal controls more powerful than those of the common law of
torts and more appropriate to the official's status should control. If one assumes that
rights established by the Constitution are more "important" than other rights protected
by the common law, the argument takes on even greater force. Cf. Nahmod, Section 1983
and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 32-33 (1974) (tort concepts may
provide helpful analogies but should not be determinative of liability under § 1983, which
serves different purposes and implicates different interests).
60. See generally Developments, supra note 10, at 1197-1204 (questioning soundness of
rationales for absolute immunity); id. (citing sources).
61. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1871); Jennings, Tort
Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 270-74 (1937); Note, The
Doctrine of Official Immunity under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1236-38
(1955).
62. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347-48 (1871); Jennings, supra note 61, at 271; Note, supra note 61, at 1236-38.
Cf. Developments, supra note 10, at 1202 (pointing out that "this rationale would logically
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Shifting defense of the action and liability from the alleged wrong-
doer to the employing agency or jurisdiction largely blunts the force
of these contentions. Obviously, the fear of personal liability would
be totally removed. There would remain some risk of interruption
of duty because of litigation, but the official would be at most a wit-
ness, and his testimony would not invariably be needed. Those in-
stances, for example, in which a judge's actions have allegedly denied
someone a constitutionally protected right are generally a matter of
record in the proceedings before the judge.
Abolishing these immunities in conjunction with imposing liability
on the appropriate government or agency would further the goal of
deterrence as well as eliminate bars to obtaining compensation, for
increased visibility would attend the adjudication of a victim's claim.
Unconstitutional action by a prosecutor or judge that occurs during a
criminal prosecution of the victim is too easily perceived as a trial
"error," even as a "technicality." If an independent proceeding were
used to force the judicial department or the state to compensate the
victim, the significance and legitimacy of a claim based on denial of a
constitutional right might well be more widely understood and more
fully appreciated, and greater public pressure to discipline wrongdoers
and prevent recurrence of abuse might result.
IV. The Wrong Burden of Proof
The burden of proof in an action under section 1983 is on the
plaintiff, at least to establish that a denial of his constitutional rights
has occurred. 63 The defendant bears the burden of establishing the
good faith defense.64 This traditional allocation of burdens of proof
seems unexceptional, but the apparent appropriateness stems from the
analogy to tort law and should not be transferred automatically to
suits that seek to vindicate denials of constitutional rights. Shifting at
least part of the current burden to the defendant would comport with
the criminal law standard, which often requires that the government,
when proceeding against a person arrested or searched, bear the burden
support an absolute immunity for all governmental decisionmakers vested with discretion
-a result which would wholly and impermissibly undermine the section 1983 damage
action").
63. Beaumont v. Morgan, 427 F.2d 667, 670-71 (1st Cir. 1970) (placing on plaintiff
"burden of showing both that.. . defendants acted under color of state law and that they
deprived her of federally protected rights" and holding plaintiff to strict evidentiary
standards). But cf. Martin v. Duffie, 463 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff need only
establish prima facie case of illegal arrest; burden of justification then shifts to de-
fendant).
64. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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of justifying interferences with liberty or property. And some shift in
the burden might help improve the victim's chances for recovery.
As a claimant for damages, the plaintiff appropriately carries the
burden of proving that he was denied his liberty by being arrested or
subjected to the use of force. But once that showing has been made, he
should not be saddled with the further burden of proving that the
intrusion was unwarranted. The defendant has access to the facts that
allegedly justify his action and clearly should shoulder at least the
burden of going forward with such evidence. Assigning to the de-
fendant the burden of persuasion as well would often obviate the need
for the plaintiff to prove a negative-that an arrest was not made with
probable cause.
Whether forcing the defendant to justify the challenged govern-
mental action would enhance the plaintiff's chances of winning is far
from certain. But it might. The plaintiff's and defendant's versions of
the challenged episode typically create a sharp dispute of fact. Rarely
does the jury hear any evidence other than the testimony of the
principals, for few arrests, searches, or uses of force occur in the
presence of disinterested witnesses. With the plaintiff bearing the
burden of proving not only that action was taken against him but also
that the action was unconstitutional, a jury can too easily resolve its
inability to decide who is telling the truth simply by concluding that
the case is a 50-50 proposition, in which event the plaintiff loses. In
close cases it is understandable, if not inevitable, that the testimony of
public officials will frequently be credited over that of the disreputable
people who often are plaintiffs in section 1983 suits. Nonetheless, the
suggested shift in burden of proof might affect a few outcomes and
would at least make the jury take a harder look at issues of credibility
in the many cases involving evidence that offers very little from which
to choose.
V. The Wrong Measure of Damages
The successful plaintiff in a section 1983 action is entitled to com-
pensatory damages65 and, in aggravated cases, to punitive damages."G
65. See, e.g., Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1976); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d
438 (6th Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Ziedonis, 513
F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1975).
66. See, e.g., Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1975) (defendant, who had
received only minor injuries, shot victims at close range, killing two and maiming third);
Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff shot in back by defendant).
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Like any injured plaintiff, the victim of a deprivation of constitutional
rights is entitled to damages that fairly and reasonably compensate
him for the actual losses he has suffered. In the case of a wrongful
arrest, compensatory damages can be awarded for lost wages, bail fees,
and attorneys' fees for defense of the criminal charge. And some value
should be ascribed to the time wrongfully spent in custody. Wholly
apart from actual losses, some courts have approved damage awards
that include a sum reflecting the value of having one's constitutional
right denied.6 7 But except in the rare case in which a successful plain-
tiff recovers a substantial award for serious injuries inflicted by ex-
cessive force, cases of illegal arrests and searches, even when successful,
generally result in very modest awards. When jurors learn that a plain-
tiff has been in prison, as they frequently do when his credibility is
attacked by prior convictions, it is not unusual for them to value a few
days of his life in jail at a figure as low as $500."8 A few hours in jail
has been priced at $100.69
Inadequate awards defeat both the compensatory and deterrent ob-
jectives of a section 1983 damage suit. The lack of adequate com-
pensation not only provides paltry monetary incentive to sue but also
adds a final indignity to the denial of constitutional rights-the assess-
ment by the judge or jury that the victim's rights were not worth much
anyway. And low awards, whether borne by defendants or by their
employers, obviously provide scant incentive to refrain from similar
abuses in the future.
Both the remedial and the deterrent purposes of official misconduct
litigation would be enhanced by providing, in addition to compensa-
tory damages for actual losses, a liquidated damage sum to compen-
sate for the value of the constitutional right denied. The sum could be
a constant amount or could vary according to a schedule for different
violations and different consequences. Any deprivation of a constitu-
tional right should be valued at not less than $1,000; any time wrong-
fully spent in jail, no matter how brief, should be valued at not less
than $2,500. As with treble damages in an antitrust suit,7 0 it would be
advisable not to inform the jurors that this liquidated damage element
would be added to any sum they might award for actual losses.
67. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 88 (3d Cir. 1965); Manfredonia v. Barry, 401
F. Supp. 762, 772 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
68. See, e.g., Gray v. DiLieto, Civ. No. 14,640 (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 1976).
69. Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (D.D.C. 1974).
70. Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Conclusion
The combined effect of these proposed changes would make section
1983 a formidable weapon in the continuing battle to promote ob-
servance of constitutional rights in the enforcement of criminal law.
More victims would become plaintiffs; more plaintiffs would prevail;
and instances of misconduct would likely decrease, for the greater
number of successful suits and the prospect of governmental liability
would combine to form a realistic deterrent to future misconduct.
An effective damage remedy would be more appropriate than the
rarely used criminal sanction and far preferable to the all too frequently
used "remedy" of the exclusionary rule. Ironically, the exclusionary
rule is often a remedy only for the guilty. The criminal can expect to
avoid a deserved conviction if he can sufficiently relate the deprivation
of his rights to the case against him. Although an occasional innocent
victim of a denial of rights might use the exclusionary rule to avoid
an unjustified conviction, too often his only remedy is the suit for
damages, limited or blocked entirely by currently available defenses.
Indeed, the deterrent effect of a revitalized damage action might even
become a persuasive reason for modifying the current strictures of the
exclusionary rule. Instead of the criminal going free because the con-
stable has blundered, the constable's employer would respond in dam-
ages for the wrong done. Some wrongs might still vitiate valid con-
victions, but a more meaningful damage remedy and a less rigid
exclusionary rule might better protect both citizens' rights and public
safety.
In 1976 Congress took a modest step toward recognizing the im-
portance of section 1983 damage actions.71 The provision for an award
of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party (if limited to prevailing plain-
tiffs) may spur increased resort to the damage action as a means of
seeking redress for the deprivation of constitutional rights. But more
fundamental changes are needed in the structure of the section 1983
lawsuit. It has frequently been observed that the mark of a civilization
is the procedure by which it enforces its criminal law. Equally reveal-
ing of the depth of a society's commitment to its constitutional prin-
ciples is the procedure it authorizes when constitutional standards have
been violated. Section 1983 can be a significant bulwark in the protec-
tion of constitutional rights. More than 100 years after the statute's
71. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)).
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enactment, the time has come for Congress to give serious considera-
tion to its thorough revision.7 2
72. Whether the changes I recommend would be appropriate in contexts other than
the law enforcement process is a question beyond the scope of this article. With this
caveat, I offer an illustration of how the statute could be amended (new matter italicized):
The employing department or unit of government of [e]very person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of the United States or
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. The United States shall be entitled to intervene in any such action on behalf
of the plaintiff or to bring such action on behalf of the party injured. In any suit
brought pursuant to this statute, immunities and defenses available at common law,
including the defense of good faith, are abolished. To establish liability, the plaintiff
need establish by a preponderance of the evidence only that adverse action was taken
against the party injured; liability can be defeated when the defendant establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action taken against the party
injured was lawful. Whenever a verdict is returned in favor of the party injured in a
suit under this statute, the Court shall award, in addition to compensatory damages
determined by the trier of fact, a sum of as liquidated damages for the denial
of a federally protected right.
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